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FORGIVENESS: A CHRISTIAN MODELl 
Marilyn McCord Adams 
Recent literature on the topic of forgiveness explores the question whether, 
in the field of secular ethics, forgiveness is not a flower but a weed. After 
analyzing approaches by A. Kolnai, P. 1Wambley, J. Murphy, and H. Morris, 
I sketch a theological point of view and offer my own characterization of 
forgiveness, contending that the latter is "at home" within the former. My 
methodological moral is that, given the differential adaptability of forgive-
ness to (at least some) secular and religious value theories, Christian philos-
ophers risk distortion when they fail to integrate their ethical reflections with 
their theological commitments. 
Introduction: 
When I was an undergraduate philosophy major, the professor of our "History 
of Ethics" course spent the first lecture defending the viability of Ethics as 
a subject distinct and independent from religion. Reviewing the syllabus 
(which included Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and Mill), he allowed as 
how the medieval period, which we were skipping, was the most fascinating 
in the history of ethics. But, as if further to enforce his division, he concluded 
with the warning that we could not bring God into any of our ethical reasoning 
in that class, unless we had a rational proof of His existence. Although 
agnostic at the time, I had been raised in the "Bible Belt," where God and 
oughts are inseparably connected. After two courses, I found myself unable 
to comprehend what secular ethics was about. So I abandoned all study of it 
in favor of metaphysics and epistemology. 
Having entered into my own "medieval period," I regret my youthful haste 
and feel drawn to re-examine my teacher's curious ambivalence. Looking 
back, I suppose he found himself in the position of many philosophers: unable 
to accept the ontological commitments of traditional religion, yet drawn to 
many of its values. So he joined the effort to preserve the latter by fencing 
off a new field, clear of dubious entities, in which to transplant them. The 
verdict on the success of this general project is not yet in; certainly the 
popularity of non-cognitivist and relativist approaches makes one wonder 
whether the old values have really been preserved. Contrasts between con-
sequentialist and deontological theories repeat the question, when the foun-
dations are shifted, can the surface stay the same? 
Happily, my present focus is much narrower, on the value of forgiveness 
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and the series of recent articles asking whether in the field of secular ethics 
it is not a flower but a weed. In what follows, I shall survey the stumbling 
blocks, uncovered by Aurel Kolnai and Ieffrie G. Murphy, to the moral 
propriety of forgiveness within a non-religious framework. After considering 
alternative diagnoses and suggestions from P. 'IWambley and Herbert Morris, 
I shall sketch a Christian model of forgiveness which avoids these obstacles, 
while (to paraphrase Murphy) mining the secular discussion for nuggets of 
religious value. 2 
The moral of my story will be likewise limited. I shall not argue the 
negative thesis-that the value of forgiveness cannot be successfully trans-
planted in the field of secular ethics. For, as we shall see, Kolnai's and 
Murphy's worries can be traced to a distinctive point of view; 'IWambley 
alludes to another. And it would take another paper to examine how the value 
of forgiveness fares within a secular Aristotelian framework. Instead, I shall 
defend the positive thesis-that forgiveness is a value that is particularly "at 
home" within a Christian framework. The contrast between my model and 
that of Kolnai or Murphy constitutes a weak "moral" argument for Christian 
metaphysics: to the extent that one is drawn to a value best made sense of 
within a given theoretical framework, one has some reason, however defea-
sible, to accept it. The differential adaptability of forgiveness to (at least 
some) secular and religious value theories also illustrates the dangers for 
Christian philosophers in not integrating ethical reflections with theological 
commitments. 
I. Kolnai's Paradox of Forgiveness 
Aurel Kolnai's bold and blunt agenda is to reclaim the subject of forgive-
ness for ethics by disentangling it from its context in the Christian religion. 
His intended method, "'rigorous' logical analysis"; his procedure, to sketch 
the concept of forgiveness and formulate a paradox-that forgiveness, so 
understood, is logically impossible-which he then tries to dissolve by more 
subtle analysis.3 
(1.1) Delimitation of the Concept 
Kolnai attempts, not so much a definition, but a preliminary characteriza-
tion of forgiveness, which may be summarized in the following points: (i) 
Forgiveness primordially refers to a context of interpersonal relationships, in 
the narrow sense of relations between two parties on an equal footing (the 
intended contrast apparently being with theological, political, or judicial con-
texts, in which one person has authority and jurisdiction over another).4 (ii) 
Forgiveness presupposes an affront, injury, trespass, or offense committed by 
one person against another.5 (iii) Forgiveness "digs deep into its object" in 
the sense that (a) the offense is recognized as such and imputed to the of-
FORGIVENESS: A CHRISTIAN MODEL 279 
fender, and (b) the recognition and imputation of the offense is at first accom-
panied by indignation and a retributive attitude.6 (iv) One can forgive only 
offenses against oneself, but not the wrongs done to others.7 (v) Forgiveness 
involves an "explicit," "intentional," "conscious decisional" act, not just a "fad-
ing out" of emotional, cognitive, or attitudinal states about the offensive inci-
dent.s In particular, (vi) forgiveness involves (a) giving up or "nullifying" the 
retributive attitude (b) without revising the judgment whereby one imputes the 
offense.9 Finally, Kolnai is inclined to see (vii) reconciliation as a possible result 
based on, but not the essence of forgiveness. 1O 
Conditions (i)-(vii) differentiate forgiveness from a variety of responses to 
wrongdoing. But Kolnai is especially eager to contrast forgiveness with what 
he calls "condonation": (let A be the offender and B the offended party) B 
condones A's offense when (viii) B is clearly aware of A's offense, (ix) B per 
se disapproves of such offense, but (x) B deliberately refrains from any 
retributive response to A's action. Where forgiveness presupposes and then 
nullifies "the original retributive position" condonation "acquiesces in the 
offense," whether out of tolerance for weakness or prudence. I I 
(1.2) Kolnai 's Aporetic Argument 
Given this outline of what forgiveness involves, Kolnai proposes to argue 
for the startling conclusion that 
Forgiveness is logically impossible, 
because only morally appropriate acts could genuinely count as forgiveness 
(as opposed, e.g., to condonation) and yet no morally appropriate occasion 
for forgiveness could arise. He regards this result as paradoxical, apparently 
because we ordinarily assume that forgiveness is not merely a logically pos-
sible and morally appropriate, but also a virtuous response to wrongs against 
ourselves. 
Kolnai's reasoning begins from what purports to be a moral maxim "self-
sufficient for interpersonal conduct": 
MPl: (a) Respond to value wholeheartedly, condemn and shun disvalue; 
(b) be grateful for kindness done to you and reciprocate it; retaliate 
(within the appropriate limits, without overstepping your rights 
and lapsing into vindictiveness, without disproportionate hostil-
ity) for malicious wrong suffered. 12 
MPJ(a) pertains to value and disvalue generally; MPJ(b) to actions. Nor-
mally, the moral responsibility of an agent for an act welds agent-evaluation 
to action-evaluation in such a way that caeteris paribus a pro-attitude towards 
the act dictates a pro-attitude towards the agent; a con-attitude towards the 
act dictates a con-attitude towards the agent (and reasoning in reverse, a 
pro-attitude towards the agent would presuppose a non-con-attitude towards 
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the act; a con-attitude towards the agent, a non-pro-attitude towards the act). 
But, Kolnai seems to assume, this link can be dissolved by another exercise 
of moral responsibility by the agent, e.g. in repentance. 
Consider a case in which an agent morally wrongs someone. Forgiveness 
of the offense would involve (by condition (iii) above) a continuing con-at-
titude towards the offense, continued imputation of the offense (by condition 
(vib», along with a non-con-attitude towards the agent (by condition (via». 
Given MP 1 as construed above, Kolnai's argument takes the form of a di-
lemma, which can be reconstructed as follows. 13 Either the link between the 
agent and his/her offensive action is broken or it is not. If it is not, then 
agent-evaluation is determined by action-evaluation, and a non-con-attitude 
towards the agent would presuppose a non-con-attitude (whether a pro-atti-
tude or indifference) towards his action, contrary to condition (iii)-which 
would amount to condonation (by condition (x» rather than forgiveness. On 
the other hand, if the link between the agent and his/her offensive action is 
broken, then it is already morally inappropriate to evaluate the agent from 
that act, and so forgiveness (which would function to split off agent- from 
act-evaluation) would be redundant. 
(1.3) Complications as Solutions 
A resolution of the paradox must envision a way of divorcing agent and 
action so that a non-con-attitude towards the agent and a con-attitude towards 
his/her action is (a) morally appropriate and both (b) logically and (c) psy-
chologically possible (First Horn) without lapsing into redundancy (Second 
Horn). Put otherwise, both horns of the dilemma can be averted only if it can 
be morally permissible to take a non-con- or pro-attitude towards a subsistent 
guilt. 14 For Kolnai, the key lies in the fact that agent-evaluation is more 
complex than his paradoxical reasoning lets on. For one thing, an agent may 
be metaphysically the same as the person who committed the offense, and 
yet morally distance him/herself by having different attitudes in the present 
than in the past towards the act of wrongdoing. And in general, agent-eval-
uation must be done against a wider context than that provided by a single 
act. Metaphysical sameness justifies continued imputation (in accordance 
with condition (vi.b) and so satisfies the demand for subsistent guilt), while 
a changed attitude in the offender makes room for a change on the part of 
the victim (as specified by condition (vLa» that does not betray the latter's 
commitment to value. Kolnai identifies actual, probable, and even merely 
possible repentance as the principal grounds for justifying the differentiated 
response to agent and act, respectively. IS 
(1.4) Notabilia 
Several salient features of Kolnai's approach deserve highlighting here. 
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(1.4.1) Forgiveness without Religion? 
Ironically, although Kolnai offers much that is interesting and provocative, 
he fails in his aim to extricate the concept of forgiveness from religion, 
succeeding at most in transplanting it from one religion (Christianity) to 
another (Morality). For his "negative," aporetic argument appeals to MPI as 
the "First and Great Commandment," enjoining whole-hearted love of Value 
and hatred of Disvalue. And his "positive" attempt to clear sizable ground in 
which forgiveness could permissibly and even admirably grow, appeals to a 
sacrificial commitment that demotes "concern about Certitude and Safety in 
favour of a boldly, venturesomely aspiring and active pursuit of Value," one 
which "expresses that attitude of trust in the world, which ... may be looked 
upon ... as perhaps the epitome and culmination of morality."16 Thus, Kolnai 
would not morally fault those moral saints who risk forgiveness even of 
hardened wrongdoers on the mere possibility that the latter might repent. 17 
(1.4.2) Judicial versus Medical Models 
Kolnai initially scorns (although he later rehabilitates) "St. Augustine's 
famous dictum 'Hate the sin, love the sinner'" as postulating "a neat separa-
bility between the sin and the sinner, which is fictitious, and insinuates a 
wholly misleading analogy between wrongdoing and illness." This medical 
model is mistaken, according to Kolnai, because the connection between the 
agent and wrongdoing (unlike that of the patient and his/her illness) is one 
of moral responsibility. Kolnai finds the medical model pernicious, because 
it allegedly encourages condonation. 18 Yet, despite his announced intention 
to eschew judicial contexts as paradigmatic for forgiveness, as P. 1\vambley 
points out,19 judicial analogues infect his analyses of egalitarian, non-institu-
tional, interpersonal situations. The moral agent who would react wholeheart-
edly and appropriately to Value and Disvalue is thrust into the role of judge, 
insofar as s/he must evaluate objects, actions, and persons. For such a judge, 
bound to render findings according to MP 1, people are either unworthy of 
forgiveness on the one hand or too worthy to need it on the other. The judicial 
model at first seems to combine with the moral meritarianiasm to leave no 
room for forgiveness. Moreover, even when Kolnai thinks he has broken the 
back of the paradox, his instinct is to measure the propriety of forgiveness 
against the standard of obligation: although forgiveness is not a strict duty 
like promise-keeping,20 yet "a credible change of heart" on the offender's 
part can make forgiveness into a "quasi-obligation. "21 There may be some 
cases in which forgiveness is entirely optional, but there are others in which 
it would be proscribed as unwise and/or blended with immorality.22 
(1.4.3) Moral Responsibility 
Kolnai's treatment places moral responsibility, of offender and forgiver 
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alike, front and center. As just noted, Kolnai insists against Augustine's dictum 
that agent-evaluation follows act-evaluation through the link of moral responsi-
bility. As 1\vambley points out, Kolnai feels most comfortable with forgiveness 
when he can identify some way in which the offender has earned it, by a further 
exercise of moral responsibility. On the other hand, forgiveness itself is a "con-
scious decisional" act for which the victim must render moral account. 23 
(1.4.4) Forgiveness and the Emotions 
By contrast, Kolnai's treatment does not spotlightthe emotions. Although 
his preliminary sketch mentions indignation and a retributive attitude (in 
condition (iii)) as appropriate first responses to wrongdoing, Kolnai does not 
pursue the issue of whether or how indignation should be overcome. Nor does 
he expand on what is involved in the retributive attitude. His focus is on 
intentional acts and "judicial" judgments or findings. 
(1.4.5) Forgiveness and Relationships 
Since condition (i) specifies forgiveness as a move in the context of an 
interpersonal relationship, it is bound to be constitutive of some change in 
the relationship. Kolnai's treatment is less than clear about the kind of 
change. On the one hand, he says that reconciliation is a possible result of 
forgiveness, but not its essence (see condition (vii) above). On the other, he 
cites possible prudential reasons for persevering in cool and distant relations 
as a reason for thinking that forgiveness is not always even quasi-obligatory, 
as if closer personal relationships were partially constitutive of, or at least a 
necessary result of forgiveness after al1.24 
II. Twambley's Twist: 
Twambley does not fault Kolnai's ambition to plant the topic of forgiveness 
in the field of ethics. It is rather Kolnai's particular view of morality, its 
apparent "obsession with duty and obligation,"25 that, in 1\vambley's opinion, 
distorts the true character of forgiveness. 
(2.1) The Civil Court Model 
Having exposed the implicit judicial models in Kolnai's treatment, 
1\vambley diagnoses the mistake, not in "going to court" for an understanding 
of forgiveness, but in appealing "to the wrong"-that is to say, the crimi-
nal-"court. "26 In the criminal court, the judge assumes a legal obligation to 
render findings in accordance with the criminal code; cases of putative le-
niency resolve into complex situations upon which many principles of the 
legal code must be brought to bear, and in terms of which the less harsh 
punishment must be legally justifiedY 
Twambley proposes the civil court as a more adequate model: the paradigm 
is one of a plaintiff having a right over a defendant; forgiveness is analogous 
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to the plaintiff's waiving that right and releasing the defendant from obliga-
tion.28 Other things being equal, the plaintiff in a civil suit has no (moral or 
legal) obligation to press his/her claim, and no (moral or legal) obligation to 
waive it. His/her doing one thing rather than another is a (morally and legally) 
"free" act. Similarly, while agreeing with Kolnai that (v) forgiveness is an 
explicit, conscious decisional act, 1\vambley insists, forgiveness is gratu-
itous. It may be motivated by diverse reasons. One may forgive "for old 
time's sake," or in hope of future reconciliation, or from reasoning by analogy 
out of a deep awareness of one's own liability to offend. But these do not 
have the status either of morally justifying or morally obliging reasons, but 
rather of explanatory motives.29 
(2.2) Twambley's Refocusing 
Having cleared moral space for the generosity of forgiveness with his 
brilliant model-shift, 1\vambley nuances Kolnai's analysis in several further 
ways. (a) Following Bishop Butler, 1\vambley brings forgiveness into con-
nection with the emotions, when he construes forgiveness as the opposite 
number of resentment. Applying his civil court analogy, Twambley explains, 
..... by offending you a man, as it were, incurs a debt (hence we talk of owing 
recompense, reparation, and apology). You are within your rights to resent 
his action. In forgiving him, you relinquish that right, you readjust your 
relationship to one of equality."30 
(b) Twambley notes how his account meets Kolnai's conditions (iii) and (vi); 
for, on the civil court analogy, a right may be waived without the plaintiff's 
changing his/her evaluation of the defendant's past act or ceasing to impute that 
act to the defendant. It is the liability or obligation to compensate from which 
the defendant is set free (Twambley's analogue of letting go of the retributive 
attitude). (c) Moreover, reflecting on his civil court model, 1\vambley insists that 
forgiveness is performative in character-one does not simply treat the offender 
as ifs/he did not "owe," one releases him/her from that debt-which Kolnai's 
phrase "letting go of the retributive attitude" obscures. (d) While his model 
preserves Kolnai's original intuition (i) that the primordial context for forgive-
ness is interpersonal relationships among equals, Twambley broadens the scope 
of forgiveness with the contention (iv') that one may forgive (just as one may 
bring civil suit with regard to) not only offenses against oneself, but also wrongs 
done to those with whom one identifies.31 (e) Finally, like Kolnai, 1\vambley 
could be clearer about what kind of effect forgiveness has on which sorts of 
relationships. His civil court model suggests that forgiveness constitutes (by 
virtue of its performative character) a formal change in the relationship between 
two parties: it restores "equality" in the sense that, other things being equal, now 
neither party "owes" the other. Other comments-such as that forgiveness bears 
the other no grudge, refuses to let the action be an impediment to relationship, 
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and may be tendered for old time's sake and out of a desire for future 
unity-suggest contexts of close personal interaction.32 
III. Murphy's Metamorphosis: 
leffrie Murphy's lively and provocative discussion interweaves themes 
from both Kolnai and 1\vambley with concerns of his own. 
(3.1) Forgiveness in a Secular World? 
Like Kolnai, Murphy wishes to assess the nature and propriety of forgive-
ness in a non-religious context for the straight-forward reason that it is im-
portant to guide one's life against a realistic picture of the world, whereas 
metaphysical claims of transcendent reality are, he is convinced, false. 33 For 
Murphy as for Kolnai, morality takes the place of religion, commanding our 
ultimate allegiance and loyalty. Moreover, although Murphy adopts 
1\vambley's civil (or private) law model in a recent discussion of mercy,34 
Murphy retains Kolnai's implicit criminal law model of morality, with its 
focus on obligation and duties (see section II above). Following Butler, Mur-
phy summarizes our fundamental obligations in terms of (MP2) respect for 
self and others as moral agents, and respect for moral principles.3s 
Murphy is concerned lest the aura of approval enjoyed by forgiveness 
within the religious context be unreasonably and unconsciously imported into 
a secular world view. Bringing matters out into the open, his explicit chal-
lenge is whether some alternatives to forgiveness are not morally permissible 
or even morally required. 36 
(3.2) Forgiveness and Feelings 
Like Butler and Twambley, Murphy opposes forgiveness to resentment, and 
in the end defines 'forgiveness' as the (i) "overcoming"37 or (ii) "foreswear-
ing"38 of resentment towards or (iii) the "ceasing to resent"39 another who 
has done one moral injury or harm (e.g. violated one's rights)40 (iv) for moral 
reasons.41 And he insists that, "Forgiveness is primarily a matter of how I 
feel about you (not how I treat you). "42 Murphy's point requires some clari-
fication here. If resentment is, on Murphy's construal, a form of anger or 
hatred, and thus a feeling or emotion,43 Murphy does not really understand 
forgiveness to be a contrasting feeling or emotion. While (iii) ceasing might 
be an event that simply happens to one, (i) "overcoming" generally,44 and 
"overcoming ... for moral reasons" in particular, suggest agent effort, while 
(ii) "foreswearing" sounds like a deliberate act, on the model of legal oath-
taking. Murphy's picture is that forgiveness itself either is or at least involves 
some of what Kolnai terms "conscious decisional acts," but these acts are 
directed primarily at changing one's feelings or emotions, rather than one's 
behavior. Murphy's move is significant, because it imitates Butler's in mak-
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ing the propriety and function of certain feelings central to the issue of the 
moral propriety of forgiveness. 
(3.3) Symbolic Communications of Respect 
Murphy recognizes that both actions and feelings or emotions have sym-
bolic content; in particular, many assert or express respect/disrespect for 
persons and moral principles. Connecting the issue of respect/disrespect for 
persons with the notion of relative status, Murphy maintains that intentional 
acts of wrongdoing 
"are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us 'I count and you do not,' 'I can use 
you for my purposes,' or 'I am here up high and you are there down below'" 
and so are insults, which express lack of respect and attempt to degrade usY 
Likewise, feelings of indignation or resentment at perceived wrongdoing may 
express or signify respect for the person wronged and for the moral principles 
violated; failure to experience such feelings might thus be symptomatic of lack 
of morally obligatory respect.46 Murphy contends that even retributive hatred, 
which he identifies as the desire to see someone hurt in order to restore the proper 
moral balance of whatever goods are in question, expresses respect for the victim 
and principles of justice.47 It is the symbolic content and expressive power of 
such feelings that makes them subject to moral evaluation. 
(3.4) The Moral Permissibility of Forgiveness 
Suppose A wrongs B by committing an offense of type K. On Murphy's 
view, Kolnai's First Horn threatens again: for how can B forgive A without 
failing to show the proper respect for "the moral value incarnate:' in him/her-
self and/or for the moral principle forbidding acts of type K? It will be 
possible for B to forgive A without condoning A's K-ing, only if there is some 
moral reason to differentiate the response to A from that to A's act of K-ing. 
Like Kolnai, Murphy finds the best grounds in reasons for divorcing A from 
his/her action: (i) A distances him/herself from his/her act of K-ing through 
sincere or credible change of heart; (ii) B may forgive A "for old time's sake" 
thereby identifying A more with past "person-stages" than with the "person-
stage" that committed the action; (iii) it may be that A meant well and 
therefore did not really intend the insult symbolically expressed by the action. 
Murphy also subsumes under the rubric of divorce the considerations (iv) that 
A has undergone humiliation (perhaps the ritual humiliation of an apology), 
or (v) that A has suffered enough (whether through physical pain or some 
other loss). But while apology does count as ritual repentance, (iv) would 
seem to make forgiveness compatible with B's self-respect, because humili-
ation may cancel the message symbolically expressed by A's wrongdoing-
that A is above B; likewise (v) deep suffering shows that A is not above the 
human condition the way his/her wrong-doing claimed.48 
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Examining two other putative grounds, Murphy concedes it might be com-
patible with self-respect (vi) for B to forgive A in order to reform A, looking 
as it would towards a future divorce between A and his/her wrong action; but, 
depending on the circumstances, such forgiveness might be paternalistic, 
manipulative, or condescending, and so incompatible with B's respect for A.49 
Finally, he considers whether one might not legitimately forgive (vii) by 
appeal to the (Kantian) Golden Rule, recognizing that we ourselves need to 
be forgiven. Murphy concludes that 
"Only a person so arrogant as to believe that he will never wrong others or 
need to be forgiven by them could (in Kantian language) consistently will 
membership in a world without forgiveness."so 
Hence, we will all have the obligation to cultivate "at least the willingness 
to be open to the possibility of forgiveness with some hope and truSt."SI 
Thus, Murphy is willing to recognize that forgiveness on grounds (i)-(v) 
could be compatible with (MP2) respect for self and others as moral 
agents, and respect for moral principles, and so would not be morally 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, he hastens to add, it would not be morally 
obligatory either. S2 
(3.5) Forgiveness, Retribution, and Relationship 
For Murphy, the way to recognizing the compossibility of forgiveness with 
self-respect is cleared in part by his more limited estimate of its implications. 
(a) If Kolnai speaks of forgiveness in terms of letting go of "the retributive 
attitude," and Twambley compares forgiveness to a plaintiff's waiving his/her 
right to damages and thereby releasing the defendant from indebtedness, 
Murphy insists that forgiveness may be "quite compatible with still demand-
ing certain harsh public consequences for the wrongdoer" -e.g., that the 
embezzler repay the stolen funds or even suffer "just legal punishment" for 
his/her crime.s3 Moreover, (b) although Murphy says that forgiveness does 
alter the relationship between offender and victim in the sense of restoring 
"moral equality" (although Murphy does not explain what he means by this), 
(c) he insists that it need not involve the victim's trusting the offender (e.g., 
the embezzler with more money).S4 For Murphy, forgiveness essentially alters 
some formal aspect of the relationship between the two parties, but does not 
essentially involve renewed personal intimacy. 
(3.6) The Moral Legitimacy of Retributive Emotions 
We have already noted Murphy's view that indignation and resentment are 
not only morally legitimate, but perhaps often even morally required as first 
or early responses to wrongdoing. For such emotions express respect for the 
injured parties and for the moral principles violated. As Murphy sees it, even 
where forgiveness is morally permissible, continued resentment will also be 
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morally allowable; it is only the disposition never to forgive that is proscribed 
by the Kantian Golden Rule. 
In a later essay, Murphy considers whether retributive hatred, which he 
identifies as (i) the desire to see someone hurt (ii) in order that s/he may 
receive his/her just deserts, is not sometimes morally permitted, indeed even 
institutionalized in the criminal code.55 To give this idea a fair chance, Mur-
phy urges, we must consider central cases 
"where hatred appears at its best and most prima facie justified-examples 
where a person (i) has in fact been treated very immorally, (ii) has been hurt 
badly by the immoral treatment, (iii) reasonably believes the wrongdoer is 
totally unrepentant of the wrongdoing and (iv) is in fact living a life of 
freedom and contentment, and-given all that-hates the wrongdoer and 
desires that the wrongdoer suffer."56 
He instances the Camelback rapist, who, in Murphy's estimate, "utterly trashed 
the lives" of the women he raped.57 Murphy argues that given a Retributive 
Theory of Punishment, according to which some people deserve to suffer, re-
tributive hatred on the part of the victim could be at once an expression of 
self-respect and of his/her loyalty to moral principles; its acting out, part of a 
strategy for seeing to it that justice is done. 58 As such, Murphy finds, it would 
be "neither irrational nor immoral"59 but rather "in principle vindicated as a 
permissible, if not mandatory, response of a victim to wrongdoing."oo 
Murphy softens this startling conclusion by noting several Kantian cautions 
against having, acting out, and/or making a habit of such hatred. For even if 
retributive hatred were in principle justifiable in certain cases, to know where it 
was justified, one would have to adopt the position of judge; to act it out, the 
role of rightful punisher. But continuing the criminal court model, Kant chal-
lenges our authority to judge another: as guilty, we lack moral standing to accuse 
another6'; as unable to penetrate human hearts and know people's true maxims, 
we are too ignorant.62 Moreover, as noted above, our guilt combines with the 
Kantian Golden Rule to give us reason to wish that the manager of the universe 
is forgiving of ourselves and others.63 Murphy sees some force in the first, but 
is not utterly convinced by the second of these points. Having conceded (see 
section 3.4 above) that we could not reasonably will a world free from forgive-
ness, Murphy insists that we should not want a world utterly devoid of retrib-
utive hatred either, because such passion serves as an instrument of justice.64 
IV. Herbert Morris' Critique of Murphy: 
Herbert Morris is puzzled about Murphy's definition of "forgiveness" as 
"foreswearing/overcoming resentment for moral reasons." 
(4.1) "Conscious Decisional Act"? 
Murphy has followed Kolnai in treating forgiveness as if it were, or essen-
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tially involved, "conscious decisional acts" which are subject, like other such 
acts, to moral evaluation, and-given the putative moral considerations in 
favor of resentment-require moral justification. 
(4.1.1) Not Entirely Voluntary 
Morris suspects that forgiveness is a process, like growing flowers, in 
which there are acts that we can take to "till the soil and sow the seed" and 
that there are other acts which will almost certainly interfere with forgive-
ness; but in order for forgiveness to "burst into bloom" there must be other 
causes at work, "the sun and the rain if you Will."65 "Beyond our action," 
Morris is drawn to the idea of "transcendence" or "grace" and "mystery" at 
the heart of forgiveness. 
(4.1.2) Moral Reasons? 
On the one hand, Morris wonders how Murphy's "moral reasons" operate as 
motivators to explain forgiveness, since it involves a process that is not entirely 
within our voluntary contro1.66 I myself agree with Murphy's rejoinder. If for-
giveness does involve the doing of or refraining from some conscious voluntary 
acts, "moral reasons" will act or not to motivate them in the ordinary way that 
moral reasons are supposed to motivate: in part by convincing the person that 
the action is morally justifiable and/or more so than its altematives.67 On the 
other hand, Morris suggests that conscious decisional acts involved in the process 
of forgiveness could and do legitimately have other motives: 
..... If one remains sensitive to the wrong done one and is forgiving, I am not 
persuaded that self-respect or respect for others need be diminished by the 
heart's capacity for generosity in the absence of moral reasons. One can retain 
one's self-respect and respect for others when the predominant explanation 
for forgiving is love .. 00"68 
A moral reason is not, therefore, necessary. 
(4.2) Letting Go of What? 
Without denying that forgiveness involves relinquishing resentment, Morris 
suspects that often, at the deepest levels, what must be let go of is a particular 
concept of oneself. Citing Stendahl and Weil, Morris notes the phenomenon of 
projecting onto other people images of persons we would "feel glory in being 
connected with," relationship with whom would "feed our need to believe in our 
own importance. "69 When others act in ways that contradict these expectations, 
relinquishing resentment involves accepting the disappointment of lessened self-
esteem. Morris thinks this sort of psychological mechanism explains the close 
connection between forgiveness and issues of status: to forgive will mean 
sacrificing the false pride involved in such projections.70 
Even if we agree with Murphy that resentment of the Camelback rapist by 
his victims need not be a matter of undue self-preoccupation born of false 
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pride and self-flattering projections,7) Morris' attention to such putatively 
non-central cases leads him to a further insight-the "non-egoistic" nature 
of forgiveness. True forgiveness, Morris believes, must issue from purity of 
heart. To the extent that forgiveness is motivated in part by the self-aggran-
dizing picture of oneself as saintly, Morris contends, it is still contaminated 
by an admixture of false pride. Given the tenacity and subtlety of this vice, 
Morris counsels "humility" and "forbearing from too ready a certitude about 
our ever truly forgiving another. "72 
(4.3) Forgiveness as Welcome 
Nor, according to Morris, is properly motivated overcoming of resentment 
sufficient for forgiveness. For Morris regards a relationship ingredient-
"something like a welcoming back with open arms"-as an essential constit-
uent of forgiveness. His paradigm is not that of merely formal relationship 
changes (analogous to changes in legal relationships of indebtedness), but of 
transformed personal intimacy between cohabitants of the same house.13 
(4.4) Religious Dimensions 
Morris concludes that an understanding of forgiveness calls one to take at 
least a short step into the realm of mystery, because its occurrence is "a grace 
of fate," what some call "the hand of God."74 Without contesting Murphy's 
denial of God's existence, Morris invites him to see religious dimensions in 
the phenomenon of forgiveness itself: 
..... First, forgiveness is a mark of a benign universe, for it is a virtue that 
benefits both the giver and the receiver, liberating both and capable of pro-
moting a state of exaltation. 
Second, forgiveness embodies generosity of spirit and is possible only through 
over-coming our contingent connection with and investment in ourselves. It 
is, in this respect, close to the divine, involving as it does some detachment from 
self in circumstances where the pull runs deep in the opposite direction. 
But finally, this good that reveals something we might fairly view as beyond 
the merely human in us is importantly beyond the operation of our will. Many 
the case where the heart has remained hardened despite intense desire, stren-
uous efforts and in the presence of good reason for it to be elsewhere. The 
concept of grace, something that makes for the good that transcends what is 
within our will's compass, allows for capturing this mystery ... ."75 
For his part, Morris is not so much fearful as grateful for the possibility and 
occasional reality of forgiveness, hailing it "a mysterious and beautiful aspect 
of who we are. "76 
V. Taking Stock: Optimism versus Pessimism: 
Kolnai and Murphy stake out common ground, as follows: (I) Both 
transplant the discussion of forgiveness from a religious to a religion-neu-
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tral context, in which the metaphysical commitments of religion are not 
allowed to playa decisive role. (II) Both assume that Morality identifies what 
is or ought to be the arena of a human being's most fundamental commit-
ments. (III) Both are attracted to a moral rigorism, which construes morality 
primarily in terms of duty and obligation, and urges a response to values, 
actions, and people, according to their moral deserts. 1\vambley aptly 
traces Kolnai's intuition to an underlying criminal court model, in which 
departures from prima facie duties must be justified by appeal to the 
complexity of the situation and appeal to other prima facie duties. This 
Kolnai-Murphy approach makes any form of generosity morally problem-
atic. And yet, forgiveness seems essentially to be the sort of thing to which 
no one has a right. 
The Murphy-Morris interchange hints at another correlation, between one's 
attitude towards forgiveness and the Optimism or Pessimism of one's World 
View. Optimists can reasonably see forgiveness as good and valuable, be-
cause they see the world as a "benign" place, where Value ultimately triumphs 
over Disvalue, where persons will-at least on the whole and in the end-be 
valued and appreciated, where loving and harmonious relationships are pos-
sible. In such a world, wrongdoing and even serious injury are not desperate 
matters, because they will be defeated in the big picture, both cosmically and 
within each individual's life. 
On the other hand, if one's worldview affords no guarantees or even reason 
to believe that Good will triumph over Evil, then grave and injurious offenses 
are more threatening. Protection against them falls to human arrangements. 
Society enshrines the values it wants protected in its version of legal rights 
and duties. Murphy espouses this picture when he approves Judge Stephen's 
claim that criminal law institutionalizes retributive emotions. Moral rigorism 
in ethics, and insistence on the moral legitimacy and quasi-obligatory status 
of retribution, are unsurprising concomitants of an outlook according to 
which personal safety is in real jeopardy.77 
VI. Theological Assumptions: 
Christian commendation of forgiveness takes for granted a realistic opti-
mism about the world and the possibilities for Divine-human collaboration 
within it. Fundamentally, it deems forgiveness possible and good, because 
the Creator, Governor, and Redeemer of the world is not a value-rigorist (3 
la Kolnai, see section I above) but generous, gracious, and loving (as the 
experience of forgiveness intimates to Morris, see section IV above). 
(6.1) The Nature of God 
The version of Christianity I am sketching goes beyond the common-place 
philosophical conception of God, as necessarily existent, omnipotent, and 
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omniscient, to affirm that God is a Trinity of persons, eternally connected by 
identity-conferring relationships of self-giving love. The love of the Divine 
persons for one another is so rich and so fertile that it issues in a will to create 
a universe to manifest its wonders, more persons with whom to share their 
love. Of all creatures, persons are metaphysically the best, because they are 
made in God's image, able to become beings who can love creatively and 
sacrificially the way God does. 
(6.2) The Worth of Created Persons 
Nevertheless, from a metaphysical point of view, creatures are "almost 
nothing" when compared to God. Thus, although created persons have 
great metaphysical worth compared to creatures of other kinds, and equal 
value in relation to one another, their principal and incommensurate 
source of worth is Divine love and generosity. The infinite and eternal 
God takes overwhelming delight in each created person. Scriptures tell us 
that He has eagerly anticipated the actuality of each one from eternity, 
before the foundations of the world. Not only does Divine love graciously 
confer immeasurable value on each created person, God expressed His 
high regard for humans by identifying with our condition in the Incarna-
tion, the persistence of that love in the passion Christ Who would have 
been willing to suffer it even for one. With Divine love as the fundamental 
standard of human worth, it follows trivially that the principal source of 
human worth is not to be found in any competitive merits (metaphysical, 
moral, intellectual, athletic, musical, etc.) humans have in relation to one 
another, or in the regard other humans have and/or express for them. For 
any disvalue in the latter two categories is engulfed78 by the positive value 
conferred by the former. 
(6.3) The Well-Being of Created Persons 
Likewise, the well-being of created persons finds its alpha and omega in 
Divine love and power. On the version of Christianity I am developing here, 
God is both willing and able to defeat79 evil utterly, not only at the cosmic 
level, but also within the context of each individual life. 80 Said otherwise, 
God has the competence and has made the commitment to see to it that each 
created person has a life which is a great good to him/her on the whole, and 
that contains no suffering that is both horrendous and meaningless. 
For each created person, the primary source of meaning and satisfaction 
will be found in his/her intimate personal relationship with God. This rela-
tionship will also be the context in which a created person can be best 
convinced of his/her worth, because it is the place where God's love for the 
individual is most vividly and intimately experienced. 81 Christians naturally 
see it as to everyone's advantage to enter into this relationship as deeply as 
one can in this world, as soon as possible. Talk of "beatific vision" advertises 
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the conviction that the Blessed 1i"inity and growth into relationship with them, 
will keep us fascinated and challenged forever in the life to come. 
(6.4) Fundamental Commitments 
Persons to Persons: According to Christians, a created person's primary 
commitment should be to God, to love God above all else and for His own 
sake. Thus, a Christian's most fundamental commitment is personal-
through Christ, to a relationship of loving intimacy with the Blessed Trin-
ity-and not to MORALITY, its principles or ideals. This is important, 
because impersonal principles or ideals cannot love you back (or in advance), 
and (as we have seen in sections I, II, and V) they have only the limited power 
of final causes to protect. By contrast, commitment to transcendent value is 
linked, via Divine generosity, with a guaranteed source of personal well-
being and affirmation. This does not mean, however, that a Christian will 
lack any commitment to the wide extension of what his secular colleagues 
regard as moral values; it is rather that such loyalty will be derivative from 
or at best partially constitutive of his/her commitment to God. For the 
Christian's personal intimacy with God will involve a sharing of view-points. 
His/her love of God will bring a dedication to learning, as nearly as possible, 
to see as God sees and loving as God loves, or at least as God wants and 
enables one to see and love. 
VII. A Christian Model of Forgiveness: 
I would like now to show how this picture of our place in the scheme 
of Divine generosity makes sense of the Dominical injunction to forgive. 
My model-making, like that of other recent authors, involves some genre 
conflations: my attempts to characterize forgiveness from a Christian per-
spective, and to quarrel with points made by others, may contain the 
makings of but do not (as they stand) constitute an analysis of forgiveness. 
Moreover, my argument will involve sketching a process through which 
such forgiveness might occur. I do not say genuine Christian forgiveness 
could not deviate from this route, or that other Christian models could not 
be fashioned by those who agree, as by others who disagree, with my 
theological assumptions. What I do claim is that my optimistic theological 
picture and my model cohere in such a way as to exhibit Christian forgiveness 
as an expression of, not alien to good and fundamental commitments. 
(7.1) Contextual Preliminaries 
I wish to restrict my attention to the forgiveness of one created person by 
another. Since I wish to characterize Christian forgiveness, I will assume that 
the offended party is a Christian; the offender mayor may not be. With 
Kolnai, I think it best to begin with contexts of legal and political equality 
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in which one person does not weild legal authority over another (as with a 
judge over the defendants, or a king over his subjects). My first point is that 
for a Christian, (i) the interpersonal context of forgiveness includes not only 
the human parties to the dispute, but God who created and loves each and 
both, the One to whom the Christian is most fundamentally committed. 
What people undertake to forgive is offense-real or apparent. Although I 
agree with Murphy that all wrongs symbolically signify (and sometimes 
actually communicate) a falsehood about the victim's worth, I do not think 
it right to reduce the category of injury to a sub-division of insult. Great 
physical pain is a harm, its infliction in certain circumstances a wrong, quite 
apart from its character as insult. Perhaps the same can be said for the state 
of powerlessness.82 
Offense can be considered two ways-from the side of the "victim" and 
from the side of the "offender." The authors discussed above all concur that 
(ii) one has genuine occasion for forgiveness, only where there has been real 
offense, injury, or trespass. Ordinary usage is vaguer. People often speak as 
if their feeling of being offended were enough. To my mind, it doesn't much 
matter how we adjudicate the linguistic issue, because forgiveness involves 
a series of re-evaluations of the situation (see section 7.2 below). Things may 
be better than they seem and/or worse than they seem, but they will always 
be more complicated than at first they seem.83 
Considering offense from the side of the offender, I disagree with Kolnai 
that forgiveness can only be of "responsible wrongdoing," if the latter 
category is exhausted by what he calls "conscious decisional acts," or if 
it implies that the harms suffered or insults tendered to the victim were 
all fully and consciously intentional. My Christian model recognizes that 
some of the deepest wounds are inflicted on their victims by agents who 
in important senses "know not what they do." Racism and sexism are 
pernicious because they involve patterns of unconscious motivation, by 
which, amidst their "conscious decisional acts" and consciously intended 
effects, the racist or sexist person perpetrates many other harms intention-
ality for which s/he would deny. Parents, too, consciously intending to 
benefit their offspring, unconsciously "act out" their own inefficient ad-
aptational strategies, contributing to deep problems in their children. Often 
it is these latter harms, more than fully intentional ones, that adults work so 
hard in courses of psychotherapy and spiritual direction to get over. Christian 
usage takes its cue from Jesus just before His crucifixion, in regarding these 
harms and offenses stemming from unconscious motivation as likewise for-
givable. 
Christian emphasis on persons' (divine or human) identifying with one 
another, particularly in their sufferings, would hold with 1Wambley (iii) that 
it is conceptually possible, and may be morally legitimate to forgive not only 
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harms or wrongs to oneself, but also offenses against those with whom one 
identifies. For example, in an ordinary case, one might forgive an offender 
for wrongs committed against one's family or close friends. 84 
Moreover, the one who forgives (iv) must view the offense as an offense 
and (v) impute it to the person forgiven, at least in the sense of seeing it as 
an action whose harmful effects issue from the agent's conscious or uncon-
scious motivation. 
Finally, our review of the literature suggests a distinction between two 
modalities of forgiveness, which I shall label "performative forgiveness" and 
"forgiveness from the heart." (a) Twambley's reference (in section 2.2 
above) to the performative character of forgiveness reminds us that we have 
a social/religious institution of forgiving. Like promising, performative for-
giveness is a "conscious, decisional act," paradigmatically, a favorable re-
sponse to an official or formal apology. More restricted than promising, the 
institution of performative forgiveness is relevant to cases in which a civil 
suit could be pressed but is legally and officially waived (as would be 
predictable from Twambley's model). It also comes up in the routine, con-
ventional, and public acceptance of apologies for small injuries (as in the 
''I'm sorry"/"That's ok" interchange between strangers who accidentally 
collide or step on one another's toes in a crowd). Performative forgiveness 
contrasts with the victim's merely failing or deciding not to press his/her 
rights, in that it must be publicly declared, whether to the offender or to 
some appropriate official personage. Our institution of per formative forgive-
ness focuses on externals (material compensations or behavior) and the 
formal structure of relationships, not on inner attitudes or feelings. After all, 
my verbal utterance may constitute an acceptance of your apology, but it 
cannot thereby effect an immediate change in my psychological dispositions. 
In public exchanges between strangers, performative forgiveness usually 
carries no concomitant commitment to try to change attitudes or feelings 
(e.g., towards the uninsured motorist who dented your fender or the stranger 
who stepped on your toe).85 But when the institution is transferred to con-
texts of personal intimacy or religious contexts, where persons have 
broader feeling- and attitude-commitments (as between husband and wife, 
or God and humans), there is a moral or religious obligation that performative 
forgiveness be accompanied by a commitment to (try to) (b) forgive from the 
heart. 86 
(7.2) Forgiveness from the Heart: A Process 
Christian forgiveness will be imbedded in prayer, because it involves a process 
of letting go of one's own point of view (regarding the situation, one's self and/or 
the victim, and the offender) and entering into God's point of view. Typically, 
this shift in perspective will involve many changes in feelings, attitudes, judg-
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ments, and desires, and will require many spiritual exercises. Usually, it will 
involve the would-be forgiver in choosing many things that s/he knows not 
to be within his/her voluntary control, with a prayer for God's help. To the 
Christian (as to Morris), actual forgiveness is a manifold miracle. 
(7.2.1) Role Release 
It is natural to feel that (real or apparent) victimhood uniquely qualifies 
one for the roles of judge, jury, and executioner. Surely being wronged puts 
one in the right relative to the offender; the suffered loss makes one uniquely 
informed of how bad what s/he has done is and what commensurate suffering 
would be his/her due. Psychologically, of course, this is a half-truth, because 
retributive emotions can cloud as much as experience informs. At any rate, 
Christian forgiveness requires of the victim an initial and oft repeated choice 
to relinquish these roles to God. 
In fact, the Sermon on the Mount forbids these roles to Christians for good 
reason. (i) First, no human being is competent to evaluate another human 
person, or even him/herself. The throes of victimhood encourage one to 
evaluate the agent from his/her offensive act alone (as Kolnai's initial 
paradox assumes appropriate), when in fact there is so much more to the 
value of a person: e.g., his/her other actions and his/her character, his/her 
metaphysical value as a human being. Also relevant are the life difficulties 
over against which the offender has had to develop as a person. From a 
Christian standpoint, only God can see deeply enough into the human heart 
to evaluate a person. Moreover, God alone is able to reckon the implica-
tions of the immeasurable worth conferred on each person by His love. 
God is not interested in the death of the sinner but that s/he should turn 
and live. He alone knows enough and loves enough to calculate the best 
pedagogical response to the offender's action. (ii) Second, the more a 
human person insists on judging out of the narrow strictures of his/her 
knowledge and sympathies, the more s/he is blinded to the wideness of 
Divine generosity (e.g., those who judge others harshly, are often harsh 
judges of themselves, and find it hard to believe God is otherwise). En-
trenchment in these roles becomes an obstacle to intimacy and collabora-
tion with God, to deepening the relationship which is/should be the 
primary locus of personal assurance and satisfaction. 
(7.2.2) Radical Honesty 
So far from being an exercise in psychic denial, Christian forgiveness 
requires the victim to be radically honest at every stage about his/her reac-
tions to the offense and the offender. As Kolnai puts it, the forgiveness must 
"dig deeply into its object" (see section 1.1 above). All of the pain and 
humiliation, all of the retributive and vindictive feelings and attitudes, will 
be put out on the table between the victim and God in prayer. Psychologically, 
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such venting is cathartic and healthy, as Murphy suggests.87 Spiritually, such 
candor is only part and parcel of the believer's fundamental commitment to 
personal intimacy with God. 
(7.2.3) Entering into God's Point of View 
Personal intimacy is a two-way street, however. God invites the believer 
to an exchange of viewpoints: First, the believer shares with God exactly how 
things look to him/her. Then the believer prays to see how things (in partic-
ular, the victim, the offense, and the offender) look to God. Usually, the 
victim's attempt to enter God's point of view will involve shifting from a 
one-dimensional picture of the offender qua offender to a more complex 
characterization, which recognizes him/her (i) as a person with problems, (ii) 
in response to which s/he has deployed inefficient adaptational strategies, 
(iii) resulting in behavior harmful to him/herself and others. The victim will 
also acquire deeper insight into how God sees him/herself, sometimes (but 
not always) as a person with similar problems and comparable faults. Offering 
the latter for Divine healing and correction leaves the victim with a more 
vivid sense of God's power to heal and/or redeem any injury and to "educate" 
one out of bad adaptational strategies. Moreover, the victim's prayerful ex-
change with God will bring him/her to a deeper realization of God's love for 
him/her and the overwhelming worth conferred on him/her thereby. At the 
same time, such spiritual education at God's hand will bring the victim to let 
go of the inappropriate projections and self-aggrandizing outlooks identified 
by Morris, for the double reason that s/he will see him/herself from God's 
point of view, and that her/his experience of God in the interchange will make 
vivid for him/her how small s/he is in comparison to God. Such appropria-
tions of Divine power and love to him/herself free the victim to appreciate 
and enter into God's love for the offender and the overwhelming worth thus 
conferred on him/her, and God's power to heal, redeem, and educate 
him/her. Naturally, our human entry into God's perspective is always 
incomplete due to our limited cognitive and emotional capacities for sym-
pathetic identification. Moreover, relationships come in degrees; with col-
legial or more distant associations, our status as victims does not entitle 
us to detailed analytical insight into the offender's personality and mo-
tives. We may expect God to protect their privacy, out of His love for 
them, and to call us to entrust the offender to Him under the more abstract 
description of 'another beloved child of God for whom Christ died. '88 
Thus, my model does not press (as Murphy fears) the victim to acquiesce 
in the estimate of his/her worth conveyed by the offense. Rather it sees 
the latter contradicted and compensated by the healing power of Divine 
love, whose omnipresent care builds a foundation for the transcendent, 
non-egoistic character of forgiveness noticed by Morris. 
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(7.2.4) Release of Retributive Emotions and Attitudes 
Insofar as the Christian forgiver aims at turning the offender over to God's 
loving dealing, s/he also chooses to let go of and prays to overcome various 
retributive feelings and attitudes, contrary to Murphy but in agreement with 
Kolnai. On the one hand, this will be included in the victim's prayer to love 
as God loves; for, given my theological assumptions, God is not interested 
in retribution, but in reform. Granted, such emotions symbolically assert a 
truth about the victim's worth and thereby contradict the false assertion made 
by the offense. When wounds are fresh, hatred and resentment, anger and 
indignation may even be the best way in which we are capable of participating 
in God's negative judgment on the offensive deed. Nevertheless, the more 
the Christian forgiver enters into the Divine point of view, the more s/he will 
see that s/he does not need them. For such false claims are decisively refuted 
for the victim now by his/her experience of Divine love.89 The victim's 
experience of God as completely trustworthy convinces him/her that God, 
who is as committed to Truth as He is to generosity, will eventually make 
these evaluative facts plain to everyone. On the other hand, when we take 
matters into our own hands, and/or even see it as our responsibility to do all 
we can to make sure that offenders get exactly what they deserve by inflicting 
what we regard as comparable suffering, we push ourselves to the brink of 
cruelty, handicap ourselves for divine collaboration, and even find ourselves 
opposing God. Nevertheless, endorsing this aspect of my model in no way 
commends, as Murphy fears, disrespectful or insensitive treatment of others 
who respond to grave injury with retributive emotions and attitudes (e.g., the 
victims of the Camelback rapist).90 From a Christian point of view, the en-
durance of extreme suffering commands respect on its own; we do not with-
draw respect when the victim deploys less than ideal coping strategies (at 
least those that do not seriously injure other comparatively innocent people), 
because it is impressive that a human being can deal with such suffering at 
all. After all, Christ paid horrendous suffering the ultimate compliment, by 
identifying Himself with it on the cross. 
(7.2.5) Forgiveness and Reform 
Kolnai and Murphy see the reform of the offender as something distinct 
from, yet related to forgiveness. For them, the forgiver will express his com-
mitment to Value or moral principles, his/her self-respect, by hoping or wish-
ing for the offender's repentance and reform; likewise, such change of heart 
and ways by the offender constitutes a reason and/or a desirable consequence 
of forgiveness. 
The Christian model I am proposing also sees forgiveness and reform as 
distinct but related. Since God aims at the growth and reform of the offender 
into a person who shares in His projects, the believer who forgives will also 
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desire and pray for the success of these goals. At the same time, s/he will see 
the offender's education, like his/her own, as fundamentally God's responsi-
bility. For we human beings can become persons who love creatively and 
sacrificially as God does, only through a process that develops our freedom. 
But when we human beings set out to do all we can to reform someone else, 
we become overly manipulative, as Murphy notes, disrespectful of his/her 
freedom. Only Divine pedagogy has the power, the insight, and the love for 
its pupil required to combine success with respect. 
(7.3) Condonation versus Vocation? 
At this point, it may be objected that my model collapses Christian forgive-
ness into condonation, much as Kolnai and Murphy suspected. How does the 
required release of retributive emotions and attitudes fit with self-respect for 
the victim? Doesn't leaving the offender's reform to God amount to passive 
acquiescence in evil? Does not the Christian view prevent either from being 
compatible with respect for Value or Moral Principles? 
I reject these charges. Although my model locates the Christian's primary 
commitment in his/her relationship to God (as opposed to impersonal and 
abstract Value or Moral Principles), it still makes Christian forgiveness com-
patible with appropriate regard for the values with which Kolnai and Murphy 
are most concerned. (i) The victim's self-respect and sense of self-worth will 
be assured by his/her renewed and deepened sense of God's love for him/her. 
(ii) Nor will Christian forgiveness require anyone to hold false beliefs about 
the worth of persons or the wrongness or harmfulness of the offense. On the 
contrary, the victim's divinely assisted attempts to enter deeply first into 
his/her own point of view and then to see things as God does, will leave 
him/her with a more nearly accurate, truthful understanding of the situation. 
The Christian leaves the definitive and universal revelation of evaluative facts 
to God, because He is the only one who fully understands them; Christ is the 
only Teacher whose pedagogy is wise enough to ensure that these truths will 
be understood by everyone. 
(iii) Nor, contrary to Kolnai's and Murphy's fears, does such humility 
connive with evil via passive collaboration. For Christians see themselves as 
partners (albeit very junior) in God's creative and redemptive work, and 
God's intention to defeat evil with good is invincible. If the ultimate respon-
sibility for success lies with Divine management, Divine vocations assign 
created co-workers varying and limited shares of the action. Although there 
will be some occasions when the call is to silent non-resistance (as "turn the 
other cheek" and "walk the second mile" suggest), more often the Christian 
will see him/herself called to a more active role in the public and private 
identification of and opposition to wrongs, in individual and collective moral 
education and reform. Bible stories and Christian history illustrate the varied 
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emphases of Christian vocation in proclaiming Good News and opposing 
eviJ.91 What is pernicious from a Christian point of view is not active oppo-
sition to evil and the promotion of reform, but the notion that "everything 
depends on us" with its correlative zeal for success that outruns human 
wisdom and power to insure it. 
(7.4) Relationships, How Restored? 
My model makes forgiveness a process within the context of a triangular 
relationship, among the victim, the offender, and God. As such, the victim's 
(divinely assisted) moves towards forgiveness are formally constitutive of 
changes in that relationship. Does Christian forgiveness also require of the 
victim such trust of the offender as to "welcome him/her back with open 
arms" (it la Morris) into any close personal association they may have had? 
Does it at least involve a preparedness to do so should the offender be willing? 
Does hesitancy on the victim's part to renew and restore relationship signal 
a limitation on his/her willingness to forgive? 
The answer, I think, is "not necessarily." To be sure, forgiveness is valued 
in no small measure for the fruit of relationship-renewal, for the way it makes 
life-together possible, tolerable, and rewarding among imperfect human be-
ings. Yet, Christian forgiveness digs deeply enough into its object to recog-
nize the roots of some offense and disharmony in the entrenched but 
inefficient adaptational strategies of created parties to the dispute. If the 
complete healing and transformation of any created person is too big for 
anyone but God, it is usually a long-term project, requiring no less than the 
creature's earthly lifetime. God deals with each person according to a unique 
syllabus, with the result that two human beings may be "out of phase," in 
such a way as to make close and fruitful interaction impossible. The victim 
may forgive and extend the olive branch of renewed friendship, only to be 
turned down by the offender. But equally, the offender may be eager to go 
back to the way things were before because s/he does not recognize him/her-
self as having done anything wrong (as is often the case with racist or sexist 
offenders) and be turned down by the victim, the latter's forgiveness notwith-
standing. Again, parties to a painful divorce may genuinely forgive one an-
other, but realize that, given who each is at the moment, any sort of close 
personal interaction is inadvisable. Such realism is compatible with Christian 
forgiveness, which sincerely entrusts the offender to God's loving dealing 
with him/her, and prays for the fulfillment of God's Kingdom, when recon-
ciliation will be complete. Put otherwise, reconciliation and renewed rela-
tionship are Christian ideals, ultimate responsibility for which rests with God; 
no created person can make them happen. The Christian who forgives is 
required to trust neither him/herself nor the offender, but God, and to view 
relationship-renewal in the context of vocation. 
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(7.5) Christian Forgiveness, an Obligation 
Forgiveness is a peculiarly Christian obligation, for (i) it is one to which 
the offender has no correlative right, and (ii) one that the victim lacks suffi-
cient resources to fulfill. For Kolnai and Murphy, (i) threatens to make for-
giveness by the victim unreasonable and immoral; for Twambley and Morris, 
(i) identifies forgiveness as a "free" and "generous" act. For Morris, (ii) gives 
forgiveness a mysterious and transcendent dimension. For the Christian, the 
obligation to forgive arises out of his/her fundamental commitment to God, 
his/her call to see as God sees and love as God loves; it is an obligation to 
be generous as God is generous. Divine generosity meets the creature's imi-
tative effort with miraculous aid, enabling the victim to forgive. And so, at 
bottom, forgiveness is (as Morris suggests) a gift bestowed on victim and 
offender alike, a beautiful aspect of human life, a sign of a benign universe-
Christians would say, an advertisement of its gracious Maker! 
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